xxx When the ETOPS Program was begun, and, because of the inevitability of future over-ocean engine failures, the maximum over-water distance that a 2-engine airliner was allowed to be from a diversion airport (closest land-based airport) was 1 hour.

xxx Also, at the inception of the ETOPS Program, the FAA required an additional inspection, by an FAA certified mechanic, of 2-engine airliners, prior to each extended over-ocean flight.
xxx The FAA requiring these additional pre-flight inspections was another "Un-official Acknowledgment" of the obvious risk of extended over-ocean passenger flights using airliners having only 2 engines, and, the need for these additional mechanical inspections, prior to each extended over-ocean flight.

xxx However, this inspection requirement, which was initially used to "sell" the ETOPS Program, was soon cancelled by the FAA.
xxx The reason given by the FAA for cancelling this inspection requirement was that it was "Too burdensome on the airlines".

xxx Then, of course, the FAA, after more "Pressure" from the airline lobby, and, without public knowledge, nor, input, allowed the airlines to gradually - little by little - increase the ETOPS Program's original 1-hour from land restriction that 2-engine airliners are permitted to fly -- first to 2 hours -- next to 3 hours -- next -- to 4 hours -- then 5 hours.

xxx The profit-seeking airlines continue to keep pushing and streching the limits of airline safety and normal human common sense, and now, in spite of the many recently occurring airliner engine failures, and, in spite of the very uncertain flight capabilities of these very large 2-engine airliners, when operating with only 1 engine, (see: United Airlines Flight #1175 Engine-failure Incident), the FAA, incredibly, has recently allowed the 2-engine Airbus A350 XWB to fly extended over-ocean routes which take these passenger filled airliners over 6 hours away from the closest diversion airport.
xxx These trans-oceanic airline passengers are completely unaware of the increasing danger they are being subjected to by these constantly increasing distances from land that 2-engine airliners are permitted to fly.

xxx Considering the alarming increase in the number of recent airliner engine failures, the FAA allowng the airlines to subject the unknowing and trusting flying public to this obvious risk shows the incredible power the airline lobby has over government regulators.

xxx The huge volumes of totally irrelevant ETOPS justification documents, and, extremely complex engine-failure , (1-engine), diversion procedures, published by the FAA, citing deceptive engine-failure statistics, (none of which were necessary before ETOPS), seem to indicate that the FAA, and the airlines, in spite of the increasing number of recent ETOPS certified airliner engine failures, and, in spite of the very uncertain 1 engine flight capabliities of these huge 500,000+ pound airliners, continue to believe the ridiculous concept that volumes of ETOPS documents, ETOPS rules, and ETOPS 1 engine over-ocean diversion procedures, can compensate for engine failures on airliners having only 2 engines, (even though these engines may be many years old, and, operate under tremendous stresses and temperature extremes, and, as recent engine-failure events have confirmed, may not be capable of providing sufficient thrust to maintain 1 engine flight).

xxx Therefore, it would seem that these airline executives, and, government regulators, continue to believe that the more written paper documents, and ETOPS rules, they publish, the more unlikely an airliner engine failure will result in an airliner ocean ditching, and, the more ETOPS documents they publish, and, the more complicated 1-engine over-ocean diversion procedures they create (and, hide behind), the more their asses will be covered should a catastrophic airliner ocean ditching occur after an engine failure.

xxx Of course, this is money-motivated nonsense, and, a money-motivated deception, not only to the flying public, but, apparently, also to themselves.

xxx Regardless of the illusion that a multitude of paper documents, (ETOPS) and, complex
1-engine mid-ocean diversion procedures, can transform an obviously dangerous policy into a safe policy, prevent engine failures, and, eliminate corporate civil and criminal liabilities, many of the recently occurring engine failures, as mentioned above, have actually involved ETOPS certified airliners, regardless of the volumes of irrelevant and deceptive FAA documentation pertaining to the "Probability" of engine failures.

xxx Any rational and realistic person knows that an airliner jet engine, like any other man-made machine, as history has shown, can fail at any time, and, for a multitude of different reasons, and, that paper ETOPS justification documents, regardless of how many, nor, can wishful thinking, prevent these complex, and, highly stressed, airliner engines from failing.

xxx That is why, in the past, more safety conscious airlines and government regulators required that only airliners having 3 or 4 engines, which had the multiple engine redundancy which is necessary for maximum safety when many hours from land, could be used on extended over-ocean passenger flights.

xxx In creating ETOPS, the FAA, and the airlines, relied on sales-motivated assurances from the aircraft manufacturers that these huge 500,000 pound 2-engine airliners were capable of flying long over-ocean distances with only 1 operating engine.

xxx However, there are many important factors conveniently missing from these manufacturer's
1-engine performance figures, and, also missing from other deceptive ETOPS diversion documents.

- SUCH AS - - -

- - - - the fact that the ETOPS 1-engine performance figures of these huge airliners assumes that all aircraft engines, used on extended over-ocean routes, are equal in performance capabilities, (which they are not), as every individual engine has its own widely variable performance capability, based on the age of the engine, how many hours the engine has flown since new, or, since remanufactured, and other factors.

- - - - the fact that the manufacturers 1-engine flight testing was done under controlled flight conditions, and, as stated above, used new engines, and, could not have taken into consideration all the possible additional and unanticipated aircraft damage that an explosive and uncontained engine failure could create, and, which could result in these huge 500,000 pound airliners being unable to maintain altitude/flight with only 1 engine, (which was exactly what occurred on Hawaii-bound United Airlines Flight #1175, a 2-engine Boeing 777, which, after an explosive engine failure, which caused other unanticipated aircraft damage and aerodynamic problems, was unable to maintain altitude with the insufficient power provided by the only remaining operating engine, and, which nearly caused this airliner to ditch into the Pacific Ocean.

xxx Fortunately, UAL Flt. #1175 was not mid-ocean, and, was only 30 minutes from Honolulu when the right engine failed, and was able to make a terrifying "single-engine assisted descending glide" the remaining short distance to the Honolulu Airport, while the vibration, caused by the aerodynamic damage to the airplane, was so intense that the airplane was almost uncontrollable throughout the 1-engine descent to the Honolulu Airport.
xxx Also, because the airplane was near the end of its long 6 hour flight, it had used up most of its enormous fuel load, and was, therefore, much lighter, but, nevertheless, even in this much lighter condition, unable to maintain altitude with only 1 operating engine.

xxx Obviously, had this catastrophic engine failure occurred earlier in the flight, when mid-ocean, and, with the fuel tanks nearly full, the rate of descent would have been much, much, greater.

xxx In an interview, following this engine failure event, (see: Youtube video "Capt. Behnam UAL #1175 Fan Blade Out Event INTERVIEW"), the Captain of UAL flt. #1175, Mr. Christopher Behnam, stated (at the 00:49:00 point of the interview) "If the engine had failed only a few minutes earlier, when we were farther away from Honolulu, we would have had to ditch the airplane into the ocean."
xxx This incident completely obliterates the entire ETOPS sham.
xxx This was an extremely close-call which almost killed 381 innocent passengers and crew members.
xxx (see: above UAL Flight #1175 link for details on this incident.)

xxx Coming so incredibly close to death was not exactly what 381 passengers expected on their way to a vacation in Paradise.

- - - - the fact that after an engine failure, the aircraft, because of the loss of sufficient engine thrust needed for high-altitude flight, would have to descend, from the clear air at higher altitudes, down into possible unforecast and severe weather conditions, which could be present at lower altitudes, such as severe turbulence, icing conditions, thunderstorms, heavy rain, and, hail, (which could severely damage the only operating engine), or, the crippled aircraft could encounter these severe weather conditions while enroute during a long 5-6 hour 1-engine low altitude diversion flight.

- - - - the fact that the loss of 1 engine-driven generator would result in the reduction of available electrical energy to vital equipment, such as the di-icing equipment, weather avoidance radar, complex navigation and communication systems, landing and anti-collision lights, fuel heaters and pumps, cabin environmental systems, and, many other things.

** (After the loss of one engine and its electrical generator, pilots, while struggling with the considerable aerodynamic and other control problems associated with the engine failures, must also react very quickly to shut down some of the electrical systems, mentioned above, in order to avoid extreme electrical over-load damage, and possible failure, of the generator on the only remaining engine.)

- - - - the fact that, after the failure of 1 engine, the airliner would lose 1 engine-driven hydraulic pump, needed for the operation of the landing gear/ flaps/slats/speed-brakes/thrust reversers, and, other important systems.

- - - - the fact that the ETOPS diversion rules are based on the time it would take for a 2-engine airliner, operating with only 1 engine, to reach a diversion airport.
xxx However, the ETOPS 3-4-5, and now 6 hour maximum over-ocean diversion time limits, (already dangerously long times for passenger filled airliners to be operating mid-ocean with only
1 engine), completely ignores the possibility of unforcast headwinds, which would significantly increase the time required to reach a far away diversion airport, well beyond the 3-4-5, and now
6 hour limit - - which, in addition to the aforementioned danger, could seriously deplete the fuel supply (Jet engines use considerably more fuel at lower altitudes).

- - - - the fact that some unforseen and/or unanticipated circumstances may develop at a remote and isolated mid-Pacific diversion airport, while a dis-abled airliner is enroute, such as runway closures or obstrucions, dense fog, or, many other possibilities which could prevent a landing upon arrival, and, when possibly low on fuel, and, many miles and many over-ocean hours away from, a different diversion airport.

- - - - and, of course, the fact that the only remaining, and, now overworked, engine, may also fail during a long diversion flight, which would result a passenger filled airliner ditching into the ocean. .